In this article, the writer presents to the intellectual readers his reflections on the question of endless regress. The writer makes the following claims, which he tries to prove using argumentation: 1. There is no difference between transcendent theosophy and Peripateticist philosophy where the need to endless regress is concerned. 2. Comparison proof is wrong in the refutation of endless regress. 3. The refutation of endless regress has no need to conditions.

Foundationalism is the most ancient theory on epistemic justification. This theory employs the metaphor of a building. Every building consists of two parts: foundation and superstructure. Superstructure always relies on the foundation. Man"s beliefs are shaped in a similar fashion, i.e., some beliefs are foundations and some are superstructure. This article first shows the principles and different kinds of foundationalism and then discusses the most important argument of its supporters, namely, infinite regress argument, and finally shows that from this argument point of view the coherentists are in a better position than foundationalists.

Some philosophers have tried to justify the existence of infinity in collections such as chains of numbers, temporal contingent and abstract souls by three conditions: actuality, coming together and succession and protected mentioned collections against arguments of absurdity of the infinite regress.In this paper, we show that appealing to mentioned conditions to exit chains of numbers, temporal contingent and abstract souls from circle of actual infinity is not successful. Inseparability of numbers and multiplicity in the first condition, lack of appropriate meaning of the term "coming together" in the second one and consideration of limitations of human minds in justification of the third condition cause these conditions to encounter serious challenges.

In his al-Asfār, Ṣadrā attributes an argument to al-Suhrawardī against the existence of existence, which goes as follows: “existent” means that which has existence. Now, if existence is existent, it will have existence. The repetition of this argument implies a regress of existences. Therefore, existence is not existent (Shīrāzī 1981, 39-40). Advocates of Transcendental Philosophy after Ṣadrā, such as al-Sabzawārī in his al-Manẓūma (1386 Sh/2007, 182), and all contemporary philosophers have attributed this argument to al-Suhrawardī, following Ṣadrā. Here is the question: Did al-Suhrawardī really present this argument? If not, who presented it? Furthermore, what is al-Suhrawardī’s real argument? The methodology employed by this research is a combination of historical and analytic methods. Research findings are as follows: I begin with historical evidence that this argument was not presented by al-Suhrawardī. By providing a classification of al-Suhrawardī’s arguments, I demonstrate that none of these arguments rest upon a premise regarding the concept of “existent.” Instead, they are all founded upon substantial metaphysical assumptions concerning existence: if existence is existent, then at least in some cases, it will be a contingent existent; possibility, unity, and necessity are objectively realized (that is, existent); and so on (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 1:340-364; 2:64-72). Moreover, al-Suhrawardī attributes various versions of these arguments to the opponents of the followers of Peripatetics, particularly Ibn Sahlān, asserting that they (the followers) already were aware of these arguments and presented plausible replies to them (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 1:354). I provide evidence from al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya (Rāzī 1411b AH/1990b, 29) and al-Maqāṣid (Taftāzānī 1409 AH/1988, 323-324) to show that al-Suhrawardī’s attributions to the followers of Peripatetics are correct, although there is no evidence for attributing the argument to Ibn Sahlān, except al-Suhrawardī’s own text. From these findings, I conclude that the regress argument mentioned by Ṣadrā is a misinterpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s text in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 2:64-65). This misinterpretation can be traced back to Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq (an exposition of al-Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-ishrāq), where he mentions a similar argument, although he does not explicitly attribute it to al-Suhrawardī. It is not unlikely that, in his commentaries on Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s work, Ṣadrā was under the impression that Quṭb al-Shīrāzī’s account was indeed an interpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s text, even though he does not explicitly mention this in his commentaries (Shīrāzī 1392 Sh/2013, 2:243-263). I then proceed to provide a plausible interpretation of al-Suhrawardī’s argument in Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Suhrawardī 1375 Sh/1996, 2:64-65). I offer reasons to show that the argument is more complex than it initially seemed. In particular, in his reply to this argument, Ṣadrā argues that, first, existence does not fall under any category, although the necessary existent does not either (Shīrāzī 1392 Sh/1996, 2:250; Shīrāzī 1981, 52-53). Second, the criterion for being a category is, to some extent, epistemological (Shīrāzī 1981, 49). This implies that the class of existences cannot be considered a metaphysical categorization of things, and hence no shared metaphysical status could be assigned to them unless we acquiesce to the unity of existence. It seems that al-Suhrawardī’s regress argument compels advocates of “existence having existence” to believe in the unity of existence. Contrary to his usual practice, Ṣadrā ultimately acknowledges the unity of existence (Shīrāzī 1981, 71). However, al-Suhrawardī presents a third way: existence is not existent.

Terrorism is the illegal use of power and violence against individuals or society to intimidate or force governments. The occurrence of such incidents is not far from expected, as these incidents have been increasing in recent decades in Iran. On Sunday, August 13, 2023, at 19:30, a terrorist attack was carried out by two terrorists in Shahcheragh shrine (one of the holy and religious places in Shiraz city) in Iran. The main terrorist entered the courtyard from one of the main doors and started shooting with a gun. During this incident, 2 people were killed and 7 people were injured. A few minutes later, the armed person was arrested by the police and the second person ran away. The terrorist group of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) took responsibility for this terrorist attack by declaring a statement. This review was written with the aim of investigating why lessons were not learned from previous incidents, especially the Shahcheragh terrorist incident that happened in 2022, and this incident was repeated again.

This paper determines the progress and regress of a set of decision making units using outlier frontiers. Toward this end, we use tow types of models: ratio model (CCR model) and nonratio (SBM model of Tone).

The main purpose of this research is to disregard the most important reason for moral skepticism, regress argument that is obtained with the help of basic ethical beliefs through moral intuition. According to intuitionist Ethical fundamentalism, the chain of justification of moral beliefs leads to those basic beliefs which ultimately leads to one of the hypotheses of the regress argument to be answered. In this approach, rational and ethical intuition can be considered as the source of justification for these basic beliefs. not in the sense that these intuitions are one of the foundations of the inference. In this sense, the " subject predicate relation" is perceived and implicit in moral propositions evidently through moral intuitions and the basic beliefs derived from these intuitions are considered as intuitive ethical beliefs. In this paper, first, the basic ethical beliefs are explained, and then the origin and justification of such beliefs are explained.